



Tightening the z/VM Environment after initial installation

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Agenda

- z/VM Background
- z/VM Security
- Issues with z/VM-supplied security settings
- “Tightening” the security environment
- Preparing for an external security manager



z/VM Background



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- z/VM's CP (Control Program) provides for management of real resources and definition of virtual machines with (only) virtual resources
- CP can define virtual hardware where there is no equivalent in the real hardware
- More granular/flexible than Logical Partitioning (LPAR)



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System Startup

- Load from device containing CP nucleus (&SYSRES)
- CP reads file on System Parameter device (&SYSPARM) to determine resources and environment (default file: SYSTEM CONFIG)
- CP reads previously-compiled directory of virtual machines (allocated as DRCT space on &SYSRES)
- CP automatically starts virtual machines specified in SYSTEM CONFIG



z/VM Security



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Authentication

- Userid/Password combination
- Minidisk passwords



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Authorization

- Resources (Real and Virtual)
- CP Commands



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Auditing and Logging



Authentication

Controlled by z/VM Directory

- Each virtual machine is defined by a USER or IDENTITY statement
- Contains name of virtual machine (userid) and logon password
- Contains passwords for accessing minidisks
 - Positional entries on MDISK statement
 - Read password
 - Write password
 - Multiuser password
 - Value of “ALL” means unrestricted access



Authorization

Real Resources

- Access controlled by:
 - I/O Configuration Dataset (IOCDs)
 - Defined by HCD/HCM or compiled IOCP source
 - z/VM Directory
 - Minidisk definitions
 - Link to other users' minidisks (mdisk passwords not required)



Authorization

Virtual Resources

- Access controlled by:
 - SYSTEM CONFIG file
 - Restricted vs. Unrestricted virtual devices (example: Guest LANs)
 - z/VM Directory
 - Virtual machine memory sizes
 - Inter-user communication
 - Virtual devices
 - Dynamically-defined virtual devices
 - Virtual terminals
 - Virtual NICs
 - Virtual CTCs
 - Virtual disks in memory
 - Are deleted when virtual machine is logged off



Auditing and Logging

- VM Event Records
- Operator Messages
- Secondary Console Interface (SCIF) Messages
- Virtual Machine Console Logs



Auditing and Logging

- VM Event Records
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-
- IBM-provided Programmable Operator (PROP) can record Operator and SCIF messages
 - Time-based utilities can routinely capture spooled console logs and route them for storage or analysis
 - SYSTEM CONFIG options allow journaling of improper duplicate logon attempts



Issues with z/VM-supplied security settings



Issues with z/VM-supplied security settings

Initial Authorization and Authentication:

- **SYSTEM CONFIG file**
 - Activates all sensed devices visible to the LPAR (by I/O Subsystem via IOCDs)
 - Prompts for spool startup mode and TOD change
 - Note: There is no “TOD Enable” button on current hardware
 - Ability to enter visible passwords (on command-line logon, link statements)
 - No notification of multiple logon attempts with invalid passwords
- **VM Directory**
 - Userids have known passwords
 - Passwords documented in z/VM Installation Manual
 - Limited use of special passwords to restrict access (more later)
 - All minidisk definitions have common or easily guessed passwords
 - READ/WRITE/MULTIPLE
 - Ruserid/Wuserid/Muserid

Initial Auditing and Logging:

- CP messages go to the userid defined to CP as the “System Operator”
 - Default ID = OPERATOR
- No logging of directory changes
- No logging of system changes made by a superuser



“Tightening” the Security Environment



SYSTEM CONFIG file

- Remove the system operator from startup decisions during normal operations
 - Enable the following features,
 - AUTO_IPL
 - AUTO_IPL_AFTER_RESTART
 - AUTO_IPL_AFTER_SHUTDOWN_REIPL
 - If set to FORCE, the operator is only prompted if spool file destruction may occur
- Turn off PASSWORDS_ON_CMDs
- Define Virtual LANs/Switches here instead of AUTOLOG1
- Create new CP command classes allow subsets of IBM-supplied command classes.
 - Examples: FORCE, SET SECUSER, SIGNAL SHUTDOWN, XAUTOLOG
- Enable Journaling to track invalid logon attempts
- Use IMBED files for frequently changed sections
- Use –system–, &SYSRES and &SYSPARM variables to reduce complexity



Example of modified SYSTEM CONFIG

```

/*****
/*          Checkpoint and Warmstart Information          */
/*****

System_Residence,
Checkpoint  Valid &SYSRES  From CYL 21  For 9 ,
Warmstart  Valid &SYSRES  From CYL 30  For 9

/*****
/* System-unique Volumes                                */
/*****

IMBED -system- VOLSERS

/*****
/* Journaling                                           */
/*****

Journal Facility ON Set_and_Query ON ,
Logon Lockout After 3 Attempts for 5 Minutes ,
VM_LOGO After 3 Attempts

/*****
/*          Features Statement                          */
/*****

Features ,
Auto_IPL Force Drain ,          /* Startup options          */
Auto_IPL_After_Restart Force Drain ,
Auto_IPL_After_Shutdown_Reipl Force Drain ,
Enable ,                        /* Enable the following features */
STP_TZ ,
New_Devices_Initialized_When_Added, /* Make new devices online */
Disable ,                       /* Disable the following features */
Dynamic_IO ,
Set_Dynamic_IO ,
Set_Privclass ,                 /* Disallow SET PRIVCLASS command */
Clear_TDisk ,                  /* Don't clear TDisks at IPL time */
Validate_Shutdown ,           /* Don't require system name */
Retrieve ,                     /* Retrieve options          */
Default 20 ,                   /* Default... default is 20   */
Maximum 255 ,                  /* Maximum... default is 255  */
MaxUsers nolimit ,            /* No limit on number of users */
Passwords_on_Cmds ,          /* What commands allow passwords? */
Autolog no ,                  /* ... AUTOLOG does          */
Link no ,                     /* ... LINK does              */
Logon no ,                    /* ... and LOGON does, too    */
Vdisk Userlim 144000 blocks,   /* Maximum vdisk allowed per user */
Disconnect_Timeout 15         /* Can be OFF, default is 15 min */

```

Contents of *system-1* VOLSERS:

```
User_Volume_List VM1WK1
User_Volume_Include VM1*
User_Volume_Exclude VM2*
```

Contents of *system-2* VOLSERS:

```
User_Volume_List VM2WK1
User_Volume_Include VM2*
User_Volume_Exclude VM1*
```



VM Directory



VM Directory

Know and use “reserved” passwords



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- NOPASS



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- NOPASS **No password required for logon**



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- AUTOONLY



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- NOPASS **No password required for logon**
- AUTOONLY **Similar to started task/process**
- NOLOG



VM Directory

Know and use “reserved” passwords

- NOPASS **No password required for logon**
- AUTOONLY **Similar to started task/process**
- NOLOG **Logon not permitted**



VM Directory

Know and use “reserved” passwords

- NOPASS **No password required for logon**
- AUTOONLY **Similar to started task/process**
- NOLOG **Logon not permitted**
- LBYONLY



VM Directory

Know and use “reserved” passwords

- NOPASS No password required for logon
- AUTOONLY Similar to started task/process
- NOLOG Logon not permitted
- LBYONLY Use Surrogate Userid for logon



VM Directory

Authentication Techniques

- Set all IBM-provided IDs that you don't use to NOLOG
 - Don't delete these definitions, otherwise system upgrades will be impacted
- Define "real" administrative users and LOGONBY to superuser virtual machines
 - Caution: These admin users should be subject to password management policies...but keep a "break-glass" password to MAINT in case all LOGONBY users get locked out.
- Set used IBM-provided service virtual machines to AUTOONLY
- Remove obsolete virtual machines after a version upgrade
 - For example, OSA/SF is gone from z/VM V7, but not deleted via the upgrade installation method, you should manually remove the virtual machines defined for OSA/SF
- Delete **all** Minidisk passwords, except for certain limited disks needing the universal read password of ALL:
 - MAINT190/193/19D/19E/402
 - TCPMAINT 592
- Carefully consider impact of IUCV ANY
- Don't 'overauthorize' CP commands to a virtual machine
 - Define new command classes to avoid full CP CLASS authority when not needed



VM Directory

Additional Directory Cleanup

- Use Directory Profiles
 - Use profile IBMDFLT for the entries that don't use any profile
 - Only use in-line values that differ from the profile entry
- Eliminate duplication within the IBM-supplied directory:
 - Use GLOBALOPTS MACHINE ESA and remove individual MACHINE ESA specifications
 - Move common TCPMAINT LINKS in individual TCP/IP entries to profiles TCPCMSU and TCPGCSU
 - Move non-version-specific LINK entries in SUBCONFIG clauses to the related USER or IDENTITY clauses
 - Keep version-specific links in SUBCONFIGs, since new versions are installed one LPAR at a time
- Cleanup like this speeds up DIRECTXA processing and reduces the size of the directory stored in DRCT space



Example of Directory Cleanup

```
IDENTITY SYSMON WD5JU8QP 32M 32M DG
BUILD ON DEMOVM1 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1
BUILD ON DEMOVM2 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2
* BUILD ON @@member3name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3
* BUILD ON @@member4name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4
ACCOUNT 1 SYSMON
MACHINE ESA
IPL CMS PARM AUTOOCR
CONSOLE 01F 3215
SPOOL 00C 2540 READER A
SPOOL 00D 2540 PUNCH A
SPOOL 00E 1403 A

SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1
LINK MAINT 190 190 RR
LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR
LINK MAINT 193 193 RR
MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM1RES MR RSYSMON WSYSMON MSYSMON
SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2
LINK MAINT 190 190 RR
LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR
LINK MAINT 193 193 RR
MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM2RES MR RSYSMON WSYSMON MSYSMON
*SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3
* LINK MAINT 190 190 RR
* LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR
* LINK MAINT 193 193 RR
*SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4
* LINK MAINT 190 190 RR
* LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR
* LINK MAINT 193 193 RR
```

```
IDENTITY SYSMON WD5JU8QP 32M 32M DG
INCLUDE IBMDFLT
BUILD ON DEMOVM1 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1
BUILD ON DEMOVM2 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2
* BUILD ON @@member3name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3
* BUILD ON @@member4name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4
ACCOUNT 1 SYSMON
IPL CMS PARM AUTOOCR
LINK MAINT 193 193 RR

SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1
MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM1RES MR
SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2
MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM2RES MR
*SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3
*SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4
```




Auditing/Logging

- Use IBM Directory Maintenance Tool or similar
 - Logs all directory transactions
 - User password management (simple)
 - Limited policy enforcement
 - Number of characters
 - Password history
 - Expiration notices via reader notes
 - Userid is NOLOG'd upon expiration, administrator must reenable
 - IBM-provided exits synchronize directory changes with Security Server (RACF)
- Use CP Operator Message capturing tool
 - Programmable Operator (PROP)
 - Performance Toolkit
- Use virtual machine VMUTIL for time-based activities
 - Send daily virtual machine console logs to a collector
- Operations Manager for z/VM can also perform these non-directory functions



Preparing for an external security manager

Why consider an external security manager?

- Limitations of z/VM Directory
 - 8 LOGONBY userids per virtual machine
 - Up to 8-character passwords
 - No passphrases
 - Passwords stored on disk in clear text (EBCDIC)
 - Need more granular access to resources for superusers
- Limitations of DirMaint
 - Limited password validation
 - Crude password change mechanism
- Single collection point for access logs
- Single point of authorization for CMS users

Note that an external security manager does not control security inside a “bare metal” operating system running in a virtual machine



Preparing for an external security manager

Determine what resources you need to protect

- Do you really need to protect access to spool files?
- Do you really need to protect access to minidisks if there are no passwords associated with minidisks?
- Do you really need to protect resources for batch execution (under CMS)?
- Do you really need to protect CP commands if you have created custom command classes?

Prepare the z/VM Directory for loading the security database

- Use ACIGROUP directory statements to define virtual machines with a similar purpose
 - The ACIGROUP will be used to define the virtual machine's default group
 - Put the ACIGROUP statement in the PROFILE; override only on virtual machines that need to be in a different group

Run the IBM-supplied utility to build the initial RACF commands

- Remove the resource definitions that won't be tracked
- Remove the class activations for resources that won't be tracked

Update RACF exits to minimize security database access

- Primarily access the VM directory for most authorizations
- Don't bother authorizing minidisks with universal READ access (ALL in the minidisk read password position)

Select DirMaint exits to send RACF updates only for resources that are being protected by RACF

- If you are only protecting userids/passwords with RACF, don't send directory updates for minidisks, spool, etc.



References

- CP Planning and Administration (SC24-6175)
- CMS Planning and Administration (SC24-6171)
- Directory Maintenance Facility Tailoring and Administration (SC24-6190)
- Performance Toolkit Guide (SC24-6209)